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Introduction
Research by western social scientists in less developed
countries (Ides) is inevitably taking place in a neo-
colonial situation; most research can be characterised
by the term academic colonialism.2 Research on
education is no exception. Neo-colonialism and
colonialism do not mean the same thing: the first refers
to the fact that Ides by definition are dependent,
powerless, and mostly poor nations in economic,
political and cultural terms. One of the consequences
is that researchers, authorities and the informed public
in a Ide perceive the western researcher as a
manifestation of dependency relations, and act
accordingly, with a mixture of hostility, distrust, greed
and subservience. Academic colonialism refers to a
situation in which general dependency relations
extend to universities and research activities. Re-
searchers from rich countries have more funds at their
disposal, more time to spend on fieldwork, often a
more sophisticated apparatus of preparation, which
enables them to dictate the research agenda, choose
the research design and metholodology, and determine
what will happen to the results. Even in cases where
active collaboration is sought with colleagues from the
host country, the research endeavour is on an unequal
footing. Western researchers generally come with an
elaborated research plan which prospective counter-
parts can take or leave, not adapt to their own research
priorities. The division of tasks among participants in
a joint research project generally places the
researchers from the host country in a subordinate
position: the team leader, who controls the research
budget, is from the funding country: specific parts of
the research are assigned to mixed 'couples' to
guarantee the 'proper' collection of data. In an
implicit or explicit way, local researchers are
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2 Much earlier 1 analysed this situation in a thematic issue of
Sociologische Gids on academic colonialism [Droogleever Fortuijn
and Brandsma 19711.
lOS Bulletin, 954, vol 5 no 4, Institute of Development Stadien. Sossex
considered to be a 'risk', for which tutorial relations
are seen as the most adequate solution. The
ideological phrase used is that the project should have
a 'built-in transfer of research expertise'. Who the
experts are, is beyond doubt (generally from both
sides). And with regard to the results of a project, more
often than not the feedback of data to the host country
is treated carelessly: data-mining, no divulging of
publications in the host country, no writing of reports
in a way that makes them accessible to interested local
people.
Nothing can be done about the fact that the type of
research we cherish takes place in a neo-colonial
situation. Something, however, can be done to prevent
that research bearing the marks of academic
colonialism. Part of the problem resides in the set-up
of a research project, part of it in the institutional
context in which we have to work.
With regard to the institutional context, despite the
strong selectivity of all educational institutions, most
of our colleagues in western countries are not persons
of independent means, but apply for and sometimes
obtain grants to carry out fieldwork. The funding
institutions have their criteria for distributing research
funds, among which perceived quality of researcher
and/or research design is one, but not the only one
(any more). They have priority areas, chosen by
themselves, or imposed upon them by governments or
private research foundations. It is becoming quite
normal that one of the requirements of research plans
submitted to them is some arrangement with a
counterpart institution. This criterion may stem from
ethical considerations to prevent academic colonialism,
but purely practical reasons also bring them to
emphasise the significance of counterparts. They are
conscious of the fact that the research will take place
within the context of dependency relations, and see
that the participation of a counterpart may legitimise
the project in a Ide. In cases where the research forms
part of development cooperation programmes, the
incorporation of a counterpart is a formal requirement
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without which it will not even take place. However,
funding agencies generally do not dig deep into the
specific characteristics of counterpart relations on
which a research proposal is based. Research
applicants have accustomed themselves to this
demand and generally take great care to produce
'letters of intent' from ldcs. The main criteria of
funding agencies thus remain their own research
priorities and the quality of the proposal. Both are
basically judged in terms of values, scientific
paradigms and perceptions of relevancefrom the point
of view of dominant groups in western countries
(universities, governments, or research foundations).
They may also reflect the values and interests of
dominant groups in Ides, but not necessarily so.
Anyhow, funding agencies have no practical means,
whatever their intentions, to take into account in more
than a superficial way the research priorities of Ides,
unless the relevant information is provided by the
applicants.
This brings us to the researcher's own role. If he has no
intention of combating academic colonialism, there is
hardly any obstacle to his having his own way,
provided he has some skill in procuring legitimising
documentation. For practical reasons he complies
with some superficial equality-improving require-
ments and takes the loss of some autonomy in the
preparatory stage of fieldwork. If ethical con-
siderations are playing a role, the situation becomes
more complicated. First, he has to find a research
problem which reflects the research priorities of
colleagues in a ide. This requires an intimate
knowledge of the research scene in which he wants to
work, which generally is better developed after than
before a research experience. Since funds are scarce for
shopping around to find research priorities in poor
countries, most researchers rely on previous experience,
or on documents indicating priorities that may exist.
But even the choice of a 'relevant' research problem
from such a list is determined by what the western
researcher thinks will fit research priorities in his own
country and therefore will have a better chance of
being funded. It is an expression of dependency
relations. An additional problem might be that
research priorities of local research institutes represent
more their own interests, or those of the government,
than research needs of destitute groups in that society
(with whom many researchers identify, in principle at
least). That these are conflicting interests is easily
assumed and sometimes true. One thing is clear: no
research theme directed at the solution of problems of
dependent groups in Ides can be elaborated on the
basis of written communication, or a quick two-week
visit. This pleads against incidental research activities
in Ides, and for the design of long term joint-venture
research programmes, which might start with a project
that is given high priority by the counterpart institute
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and includes a search for research priorities, the results
of which accrue to disadvantaged groups in society.
Second, a good working relationship with counter-
parts has to be established, avoiding academic-
colonialist overtones. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I
formulated some general rules for a joint-venture
agreement, which might contribute to more equal
relations between western and local social scientists in
a joint research project [Droogleever Fortuijn, van
Giffen and Oud 1972]. The main dimensions of a real
joint-venture are the following. Both partners
participate on an equal footing in the choice of a
research theme, the consultation and decision-making
concerning the design and execution of the research
project. In the case of a larger research team, there is
dual leadership, each part choosing its own leader who
acts internally as coordinator, and externally as a
representative, diplomat, liaison officer or whatever.
All decisions concerning the research design,
implementation, spending of research funds and ways
of publication are team decisions. In situations of
disagreement about procedural questions a majority
of team members decides. In case of decisions that
have important consequences for the course of the
project, each team member has the right to veto.
Division of labour among team members should take
into account the specific capacities and interests of
each. Each team member is responsible for the
execution of her or his specific part and should
regularly inform other team members on the progress
being made. Each team member has free access to the
research data of the other ones, with due respect to the
privacy and anonymity of informants and the
confidentiality of the information they have given.
A third problem refers to the management of data and
publications. Publication of results is the responsibility
ofthe whole team, but the way in which results will be
presented is the individual responsibility of each
member. Each team member has the right to publish
on his or her specific subject, after consultation of and
review by the other members. If necessary, a
translation of each manuscript in an agreed language
must be given to all. A final report on the project will
be written under collective authorship. A condensed
version, containing the most important data,
conclusions and possibly policy recommendations will
be published in the official language(s) of the host
country, in a style that makes it accessible to interested
laymen. The major libraries in the country where the
research takes place will receive a copy of each
publication. Both parties receive a complete set of the
research data, if possible in the original form, but in
any case the finished data (punch cards, tapes,
computer output, interim reports and notes, etc).
As one can imagine, a researcher working together
with colleagues from ldcs according to these general
principles is not taking the easiest way. In the
following sections a case study is presented of a
research project which was based on a joint-venture
agreement according to these rules, with comments
upon the cultural and institutional barriers
encountered.
Short History of a Research on Education
in Venezuela
Preparation
The idea of the research had its origin in the Institute
of Applied Sociology of the Unïversity of Amsterdam,
and was inspired by the economic bias in development
planning of the sixties. The aim was to construct and
elaborate a research instrument which might enable
planners to collect data for the design of a long term
national development strategy for Ides that paid
attention not only to economic growth, but also to
political development, education, health and inter-
national dependency relations. The complete staff of
the institute would participate (five researchers), and
for both ethical and practical reasons collaboration
was sought with like-minded research institutes in
several Ides. Three consecutive research projects in
different countries were planned.
In July 1971, we sent a four page note on our research
idea to 86 research institutes all over the world,3 with
an invitation to participate in a joint-venture. We
received about 40 replies, 20 of which were positive.
To these we sent a larger discussion paper, indicating
our preference for focusing on four main research
topics: the analysis of the power structure and
organisational networks in the economic system, the
political system, the educational system and inter-
national relations. It should be a macro-sociological
evaluation study of the functioning of a whole society,
with the intention to formulate general policy
recommendations for a development strategy. Several
rounds of exchanging discussion notes and letters
finally reduced the number of prospective participants
to three, one in Kenya, one in Nigeria, and one in
Venezuela.
In the meantime working relations within the Institute
of Applied Sociology deteriorated, because of
fundamental differences of opinion on the research
design. This led to a loosening of the cooperative
bonds; the general objectives of the project remained,
but not the idea of a team project with shared
fieldwork, research design and methodology. Two
team members, Peter Oud and I, both with a special
Addresses were obtained from UNESCO's Tite World of Learning,
which gives short information on the research interests of the
institutions covered.
interest in the political and educational aspects of
development planning, continued along the course
begun, trying to find a research institute to cooperate
with. After discussions in Paris (April 1972) with the
Director of the Centro de Estudios del Futuro de
Venezuela (CEFV) of the Catholic University Andrés
Bello (UCAB) in Caracas. in October 1972 we reached
a formal agreement to start the project, focusing on
the educational aspects of national planning - which
reflected to a high degree the research priorities of
both the CEFV and the Venezuelan Government. In
the meantime, we had applied in April 1972 for
research funds from the Netherlands University
Foundation fo r International Cooperation
(NUFFIC).4 They declined even to consider the
application; because of budget cuts new projects could
not be funded in that year. We pleaded, with success,
that they at least examine the programme, with the
argument that a positive evaluation would make it
worthwhile to continue preparations with CEFV, even
if we could not get funds for 1973. Moreover, a
positive reaction would make it easier to apply
elsewhere for funds covering costs in 1973 (and - not
said - would lay a strong claim on the 1974 budget).
The judgement was positive, although there were some
reservations as to the scope of the project and the
political context in which it would be carried out.
NUFFIC wanted to receive a much more detailed
research design, in order to assess its feasibility. A
second barrier was put in front of us: although we
could draw up a detailed research design, we did not
want to do so without our Venezuelan colleagues. A
necessary condition for writing it together would be
intensive discussion. NUFFIC would not pay for a trip
to Caracas; CEFV could not afford a trip to
Amsterdam. The stalemate was broken by a grant
from the research funds of our own faculty. In the
spring of 1973, we want to Caracas and had a most
fruitful series of discussions, which resulted in a
research design, a detailed budget, a division of tasks
among the two Dutch and three Venezuelan team
members, and the signing of a formal agreement based
on the principles mentioned in the introduction. Our
Venezuelan counterparts considered this agreement
quite unnecessary, but since we insisted on it they
made no objections (and proved to be very skilled in
the subleties of contract formulation, in accordance
with Ibero-Hispanic legalist tradition so widespread in
Latin America). The Director of CEFV managed to
get the director of the Venezuelan national planning
office CORDIPLAN to write a letter to the Dutch
Government, requesting that the Dutch team
members be sent as technical experts to Venezuela
A government agency which consideres applications for pro-
grammes and projects of cooperation between Dutch and dc
universities, funded by the Dutch Government from the budget for
deveiopment cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Directorate-
Generai for international Corporation).
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(May 1973). In April 1974, the Dutch Government
decided to pay for the research costs of the project for
12 months (salaries and minor administrative costs
would be covered by the participating universities).
The fieldwork could start.
Fieldwork
In September 1974 we arrived in Caracas. In the
months before, we received vague indications that the
CEFV was in trouble, although the exchange of
opinions on the operationalisation never faltered. We
even postponed our departure, to get a clearer idea of
the situation, but finally decided to go (with the idea
that our presence would be a fait accompli, which
might help the CEFV solve its institutional problems).
On our arrival, we found CEFV had virtually ceased
to exist: the only persons left were the Director and his
secretary; the rest of our counterparts had taken other
posts and were unable to work on the project. A
combination of two factors had contributed to this
inconvenient situation. First, CEFV had tried to
disengage itself from its university, UCAB. The
direction of UCAB had tried two years earlier to
incorporate the staff of the research institute into
normal teaching activities (we were informed of that
during our preparatory trip, one and a half years,
earlier). Since it is a private university, it depends to a
great extent on student fees and considered the 12
full-time researchers of CEFV a luxury they could not
afford any longer. The director of CEFV saw the risks,
looking at normal Venezuelan university life: there
would be no time left for research. CEFV received
about 10 per cent of its budget from the UCAB, the
rest coming from contract research for ministries and
private institutions. The director thought the CEFV
could lead an independent life, and disengaged CEFV
from the UCAB in the second part of 1973. Relations
with the government were excellent, among other
reasons because one of the staff members (also one of
our counterparts) was a daughter of the then
president. However, in December 1973, the reigning
Christian Democratic government of Caldera lost the
presidential elections, and Carlos Andrés Pérez of
Acción Democrática took over in March 1974. With
the reigning spoils system, this meant a collapse of
CEFV's network of relations, at least temporarily. No
governmental agency dared to start new projects for
many months before and after the elections, so research
contracts withered away. But not from one moment to
the other, so the director believed that it could be a
temporary slack period with a recovery in due course.
Nothing of the kind happened, however.
The first months of our fieldwork were mainly used for
filling in the last loose ends of the research design and
drawing samples of educational institutions, while
waiting for the recovery of the CEFV. In the beginning
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of 1975, it became clear that we had to look for a new
counterpart, since one of NUFFIC's and our criteria
was to have one. Much time was devoted (in hindsight,
one could say, lost) to finding a new counterpart
institution. One month before the official end of
NUFFIC-sponsored fieldwork, the director finally
found one: the Division of Educational Research of
the Sector Office of Planning and Budgeting (OSPP)
of the Ministry of Education. Not a real university
counterpart, as NUFFIC stipulated, but from the
viewpoint of the research objectives a most
strategically placed governmental organisation. Three
staff members were assigned to the project, and a new
division of tasks could be made, although in a
situation we loathed to be in: the research plan was
completely finished, our own tasks well delineated, so
the only thing the OSPP could do was to take or leave
it. It appeared to be our problem, not theirs. They took
it.
Although formally we had a new counterpart, it did
not work in practice. After a few months, one of our
new colleagues retired for health reasons and could
not be replaced. And to the other two were assigned so
many other tasks, that little time was left for the
project. One, a party activist of the new government
party, had to do a great deal of party work in and
outside the ministry. The other was graduating from
the university and much involved in other research
projects of the Office. In fact, the research tasks of five
persons for one year had to be done by the two Dutch
team members. Some cuts and rearrangements were
made, and outside assistance was sought.
In November 1975, we got the assistance of the Centre
for the Study of Education in Developing Countries
(CESO) in The Hague, to supervise a number of case
studies in a small selection of Venezuelan schools.
Interviews and observations of classroom activities
formed the main part of this task. Originally, it would
have been carried out by the CEFV, but CESO was
most helpful in filling this gap. It paid for a three-
months consultancy, in which a staff member, with the
collaboration of a Dutch graduate student, supervised
a team of 14 Venezuelan students, who were paid out
of our research budget.
In May 1976 the NUFFIC contribution came to an
end, with the fieldwork well underway but still far
from finished. NUFFIC made ciar that an extension
would be out of the question. The Venezuelan
Ministry of Education wanted to extend the period of
fieldwork and tried to get funds, first from the
National Planning Office, without success, later from
the Venezuelan National Council for Scientific and
Technological Research (CONICIT) to pay our
salaries for 15 months. In November 1976 a contract
with CONICIT was signed for a period of 12 months
(June 1976 and May 1977), with a possibility for
renewal for three months.5
In the middle of 1977, we contracted a private research
bureau, Tecnotrónica Internacional CA, to carry out a
survey among a representative sample of about 800
Venezuelan households, to get a hold on the latent
social demand for formal and non-formal education.
The director, part-time professor in statistics and
research methodology at the Universidad Central de
Venezuela, was approached in an earlier phase to
become a team member. Since the CEFV could not
find the funds to pay him, this had not happened. But
now he was able to participate, without salary (he
considered our project as professionally stimulating),
but we had to pay for the interviewers. Our budget did
not include these additional costs, since in the original
plan this would have been part of the contribution of
the CEFV. But NUFFIC once more appeared to be
most generous in providing the additional funds.
From an organisational and technical point of view,
this survey ran smoothly, under the competent
supervision of the director of Tecnológica Inter-
nacional.
In June 1977, the Ministry of Education submitted the
necessary information for the renewal of our contracts
with CONICIT (three months for myself, one year for
Oud). Our fieldwork was nearly finished, but Oud
feared that the data processing and write-up would
meet with insurmountable difficulties once we were
back in Holland, so he wanted to finish the job on the
spot. It would, moreover, enable him to discuss the
results and recommendations with policy makers.
Administrative procedures took too much time, so we
both had to return to Amsterdam to resume our
teaching tasks. In August 1977 we left Venezuela.
Writing
In October 1977, CONICIT approved the prolongation
of our contracts, but it was not until April 1978 that
this information was passed onto us. In June 1978, the
Ministry of Education reiterated its interest in the
continuation of our work. Oud returned to Venezuela
in October 1978 to write his policy reports, which he
was able to discuss with the authorities. In July 1979,
he finished his part of the research project, dealing
with non-formal education. For personal reasons I
chose to stay in Holland. Problems with CONICIT
over the contracts remained until the end, and we
never received the salary for the last three months of
1977. At the end of his stay, Oud had to 'rescue' the
data of the household survey. The Director of
Tecnotrónica Internacional had subcontracted the
data processing of the questionnaires, but had not
CONICIT could only subscribe to contracts of a maximum of 12
months.
sufficient money to pay his partner. This person
refused to return the material and took it hostage. Oud
had to pay him from his own purse to get everything
back. We divided the loss.
Oud proved to be right: additional teaching tasks
compensating for our long absence, and much
organisational work for the faculty, prevented any
prolonged investment of time in processing my huge
amount of data.6 NUFFIC was not prepared to pay
any additional costs. For them, the project had been
closed in January 1978, and since, according to new
criteria for the selection of projects, Venezuela was no
longer considered as a ldc,7 no new application would
be taken into consideration. Once again, the research
budget of the faculty came to the rescue: a team of
coders was paid out of it, and they did in a few months
what would have taken me one and a half years of full
time coding. The faculty also paid the printing costs of
one of my policy reports. Nevertheless, it was only in
1981, that the processing of data was more or less
finished, and that I could start writing. During the
academic year 1981-82,1 had a sabbatical leave, which
however was largely spoiled by an internal reorgani-
sation of the faculty. A commission which had to
formulate recommendations to cut the teaching staff
had chosen to eliminate the Institute of Applied
Sociology. The struggle-for-life took two years, in
which research activities reached virtual stagnation. I
was finally transferred to another department, which
did not want to have anything to do with research in
ldcs. One policy report could be finished, but pressure
to dedicate all research time to the production of
'scientific' publications prevented me from continuing
writing policy recommendations for the Venezuelan
Government.
Some Cultural and Institutional Barriers
From the organisational point of view the research
project encountered a good many problems. Some
were our own fault and perhaps we could have
prevented them, but most were due to adverse
circumstances in which we were as powerless as
anybody else involved in the project. They will be
discussed under four headings: finance, counterparts,
fieldwork, and data.
This included the coding of nearly 2,000 questionnaires from pupils
from primary and secondary schools, 66 extensive questionnaires
and interview protocols with teachers, and about 250 large interview
protocols with educational authorities (among them school
directors, inspectors, representatives of teacher unions, educational
pressure groups and private organisations; and high civil servants in
the Ministry of Education).
Considering only the old fashioned criterion of per capita income,
they of course are correct. From the viewpoint of distribution of
welfare - however measured - Venezuela is among the most
unequal societies in the world, with large parts of the population
ltving in miserable conditions.
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Financing the project: who is dependent on whom?
Many agencies were involved in the funding of the
research. Taking into account our normal university
salary, the biggest funding institution was the
University of Amsterdam. This part of the budget was
provided independently of the characteristics of the
research project. The second largest, but most crucial
one was NUFFIC, which provided most travel and
fieldwork expenses, and the paying of two substitutes
for nine months. Third in importance was CONICIT,
which paid nearly three man-years of salary and some
travelling expenses. Smaller contributions came from
the CEFV, the Venezuelan Ministry of Education and
the National Council of Human Resources (CNRH)
(mainly in the form of administrative facilities and
office room), CESO, and our own faculty.8 This last
contribution, although relatively small, was most
important, because by paying for our preparatory trip
it broke the vicious circle created by the combination
of our basic approach - not to impose a ready made
research plan on our prospective counterparts, and the
norms and criteria for subvention of NUFFIC, which
only considers fully elaborated research designs. lt
triggered the whole project.
Each of the important contributors presented its own
barriers, through which our negotiating skills were
probed (and sometimes their flexibility severely
tested). Looking back on the whole episode, I think we
were rather successful - but at what costs! A
tremendous amount of time went into redrafting again
and again documents to legitimate new or old
requests, new proposals, or overdrawn budgets. The
basic mistake we made was to submit too low a budget
to NUFFIC, especially with regard to data processing,
time required for writing policy reports, and getting
these reports printed. Another miscalculation (I still
doubt whether it can be called a mistake) was our
reliance on the financial contribution from the CEFV.
In the pre-fieldwork stage, NUFFIC proved to be very
exacting with regard to our project. Our approach was
new to them, and they considered it rather ambitious
(with reason, I should add). They therefore asked for
much more information about the counterpart and
much more details about the research design than
normally is the case. A quite unfortunate circumstance
was the lack of research funds in the year we wanted to
start the fieldwork. And after approval, red tape in
Holland to obtain agrément with the Venezuelan
Government took an additional six months. The delay
of one and a half years certainly deterred our first
Although forming part of the University of Amsterdam, it has a
separate small research fund, on which decisional power rests with
the Faculty Council, not the central administration of the
university, so I count lt as a separate institution. There were sorne
miniscule contributions 1mm a Dutch organisation (WUS), which
subsidises fieldwork n ldcs of graduate students. Two students who
participated in the case studies received a small grant from this
source.
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counterparts from putting much time into the
preparation of their part, being unsure whether it
would lead to anything and the long period of
uncertainty probably weakened their position in the
struggle for independence they were fighting (and
eventually lost). When NUFFIC finally decided to
support the project, it proved to be a most lenient
funding agency during the fieldwork. Of course, it was
not only leniency; they would have lost all the money
already invested if they had forced us to come back
after one year. lt was not only in our interest to get
fieldwork to continue: it would have been for them a
project that failed, not something a government
agency (or any other organisation) likes. But real
empathy with our adversities was the dominant theme
in all communications we had with them.
Relations with CONICIT about the payment of our
prolonged stay were of a different kind. Our own role
was subsidiary to the role of the director of the CEFV.
the director of the Planning Office, and the Minister of
Education. We were mainly observers and providers
of information on the fieldwork, not negotiators. In
Venezuela, fundraising is never done by the
fieldworker himself, so we remained back stage. Our
only task was prodding the actors to keep moving, by
being a permanent, friendly but insistent nuisance.
The main argument used with all force, was that the
Ministry of Education was most interested in the
results of the research, but had no funds to pay for the
prolongation. 'What a pity ït would be to lose
everything, if CONICIT would not help.' It was and
remained a strong lever. They finally did consent after
six months of frequent pressing. They did it again
more than a year later. Decision-making in CONICIT
was so slow that their second decision (to keep Oud for
one more year) came too late. We both returned to
Holland. After a year, Oud could come back to
Venezuela. Not until the end of his stay did he get his
contract, and then on worse terms than promised. We
never received everything which was formally
promised, but nevertheless the contribution of
CONICIT was considerable and vital for the whole
project, since it enabled us to finish the fieldwork.
In a formal sense, the largest part of the funds came
from Holland, which might be an indication of
academic colonialism. However, two considerations
mitigate this picture, in such a way that one may ask
who depended on whom. The first is that 'Holland' is
an abstraction: the University of Amsterdam,
NUFFIC, and our own faculty are separate
institutions, each with its own decision-making
structure and its own interests. The central office of
the university, as the biggest provider of funds
(salaries), was only formally involved and did not play
any active role. The faculty acted as a research
entrepreneur by taking the risk of paying for our
preparatory trip to Caracas (about 10 per cent of the
annual budget for about 3 per cent of the staff). With
more foresight than NUFFTC,9 they saw our point
that a personal encounter with a prospective
counterpart was a necessary condition to establish
joint-venture research relations (that it is not a
sufficient condition, our own experience proves). So.
the faculty gave us the benefit of the doubt, as
NUFFIC did at a later stage. We were the Initiating
and asking party, dependent on the goodwill and
arguments we were able to mobilise. In Venezuela, the
situation was not very different. To a great extent, we
were dependent on the positive judgement of our
research and on the personal goodwill we could
establish, to influence first the director of the CEFV,
and later on also the director of the Educational
Planning Office. Although both most certainly had
their moments of regretting that they ever got involved
in the project, personal relations remained excellent
during all those years. Together, we were dependent
on the Minister of Education and CONICIT to bring
the fieldwork to an end. If they had said no, the project
would have collapsed. There was never any pressure
from the Dutch Government on the Venezuelan
Government to provide for the necessary additional
funds. The only assets we had were our sheer presence
and 'prodding-power', and the attractiveness of the
results they could expect.
Establishing cooperative relations with
counterparts: how the West was lost
In fact, we never got a counterpart, only a rather
influential network of strategically placed people who
saw something of value in our project. The
preparatory trip seemed promising: relations with the
staff members of CEFV were excellent, and
stimulating from a professional point of view. Our
'ethical stance', although considered a bit queer, was
accepted without reservation or any attempt to exploit
it. On our arrival in September 1974, the situation at
CEFV was most delicate: nearly all staff members,
among them all our counterparts, had left, but the
director expressed (and probably had) good hope of
finding funds at short notice to pay the counterparts.
We had to be patient, 'since, as you know, these things
are normal in less established societies like Venezuela'.
We were patient and got ourselves settled. When in
December nothing had happened, we suspected that
something was really wrong, and suggested taking
active steps to find another counterpart. We explained
that their participation, apart from practical con-
siderations, was a formal requirement ofNUFFIC, so
the continuity of the whole project was at stake. But
This was lO 'years ago. Now. NLJFFIC and other governmental
funding agencies are more open to tnvesting in preparatory trips, in
order to get well elaborated research designs and well established
counterpart relations.
no, 'there were some promising contacts'. In April
1975, we became active ourselves in the search for new
counterparts. In the following months we started
conversations with all kinds of official and private
research institutes, to which we presented our project.
This distracted us from the fieldwork proper. Nothing
came of it, until the director of the CEFV found a most
ingenious solution: CEFV would be integrated (with
its few remaining projects) into the Planning Office of
the Ministry of Education (OSPP), and our project
would be the responsibility of both, while three staff
members of the Division of Educational Research
would be added to the research team. Meanwhile, we
had dropped our nice ideas about joint activities on
the basis of equality, and, because of professional
self-interest, were primarily interested in a formal
partnership which would meet the minimum require-
ments of NUFFIC. NUFFIC approved of this
construction, and we decided to carry out the research
on our own. Any assistance that might come our way
would be most helpful, but we did not count on it.
That proved to be a wise, although lately arrived at,
decision.
Hindsight suggests that we were very naïve in counting
so much on our counterpart, and that we were too
passive in finding another one,tO or discarding the idea
of an effective counterpart altogether. Hindsight,
however, makes judgements easy. One can agree that
our own interest in getting the project started had
brought us to accept CEFV too easily as a viable
counterpart. The political situation (Christian Demo-
cratic government; CEEV forming part of a catholic,
private university; the daughter of the president as a
team member) may have been assessed in advance as
something that would work against the continuity of
the project, instead of promoting it. But three years of
active participant observation in Venezuelan society
and bureaucracy has led me in second hindsight to a
more qualified vision. Of course, a country with a
strong tendency to a spoils system in the filling of
political positions lacks continuity in all kinds of
networks. There is, however, a mechanism working in
a contrary direction (after all, the lack of continuity is
a daily problem for all Venezuelans). Every higher
civil servant is, from the moment he occupies a
government position, preparing his private alleys to
other positions, in case the political tide changes.
Much of his time is dedicated to the maintenance of a
wide-ranging network of instrumental friendship
relations within and across party boundaries. So did
the director ofCEFV, throwing out many small fish in
the hope of catching a big one. He caught one; after
one and a half years he became secretary to the
president of the newly created National Council for
Human Resources (CNRH), a body created by the
'1This is the opinion of the evaluator svho tried to assess the
cooperation side of our relations with the counterpart [Jansen 1976].
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Acción Democrática government to make studies of
and to advise on the long term human resource
development of Venezuela. He disengaged CEFV
from the Planning Office of the Ministry of Education
and passed it over to the council. The only thing that
was exceptional was the time it took him to find a new
institutional base; it came too late to provide the
project with new team members. So, the fact that he
promised us an early recovery of CEFV might appear
at first hindsight to have been a smoke screen, but on
second thought was a real probability within the
Venezuelan context, which just did not materialise in
time. No intervention on our behalf could have
changed our ill luck by a jot.
My conclusion is that the general way the political
system functions, formed a structural barrier to
establishing good counterpart relations. Our problems
might have been foreseen, but our relatively powerless
position did prevent any effective intervention.
Venezuela is not a country in which any foreign
researcher, in simple virtue of being that, has free
access to top decision makers.
One could say that our (typical western, or should I
say Dutch) ethical approach was a barrier to the
decision to drop the search for effective counterparts. I
estimate that we lost more than one man-year of
fieldwork time in order to get a counterpart and to get
things financed from the field (not to count the time
the director of CEFV invested in the management of
the project, which was considerable). I still do not
regret it, and I still regret that our private interest in
getting the project moving, finally interfered with the
principles on which it was based. Ethical principles
should be maintained, but they never replace the
private, professional motives of western researchers.
Relations with our second counterpart, the research
department of the Ministry's planning office, have
always been cordial but superficial. Through our
experience there, I remain convinced that effective
cooperation can be established only if a research
project is their 'own' initiative. Readymade research
designs can never function as a motivating force,
attractive though the results foreseen may be to the
counterpart. However, one has to be more specific on
this point. Within CEFV, working relations between
staff members and director were not outspokenly
hierarchical, so our wish to establish democratic
relations with the counterpart was congruent with the
subculture of that institution. The Ministry of
Education is another affair. Venezuelan public
bureaucracy is highly centralised and hierarchical,
with a strong tendency to concentrate decisional
power at the top, even on seemingly unimportant
issues. Thus, the agenda of the direction of the
Educational Planning Office is crowded, while
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subordinates among them research personnel are
waiting for orders. In such a situation the expectation
of establishing equal working relationships with
colleagues is wishful thinking. One is placed in the
'expert' role, whether one likes it or not (we didn't). To
get the motivational investment of people working in a
hierarchically organised counterpart institution, one
has to work on two levels. With a director, equal
relations can and should be established. Wïth regard
to colleagues, the western researcher has to swallow
his democratic ethos (if he has any) and accept the
hierarchical norms of the host institution, or to teach
them gradually to take the initiative - which may take
at least half a year of intensive collaboration. Formal
agreement on an equal input is perhaps necessary, but
of no practical use; the practical consequences should
be constantly negotiated, which takes a lot of time.
Carrying out the fieldwork: the field is dangerous
and dirty, but diverting
The most significant cultural barriers between Dutch
and Venezuelan academic communities refer to ideas
about the way fieldwork should be carried out. The
social sciences in Venezuela are taught in two separate
ways. On a theoretical level, dependency theory
dominates; leading social scientists are inclined to this
theoretical approach, and generally find a willing ear
among their students. Apart from serving theory
building, this has an important political function:
university autonomy permits teachers and students to
express freely all kinds of criticism on the present
capitalist regime, without the risk of economic
sanctions. Most leftist parties draw their cadre from
the (public) universities, students and professors alike.
But there is a deep cleft between theoretical discourse
and empirical research. Even field research which
departs from dependency theory is characterised by
the most crude forms of empiricism. Methodology
courses impose the idea that fieldwork is equal to
standardised survey research. The creativity of the
researcher resides in the design of sophisticated
questionnaires, and computerised data analysis. But
the collection of data is considered as dirty routine
work that possibly should be contracted out to non-
academic interviewers.
We had considerable difficulty in combating the
emulation of North American empiricism of the fifties
and sixties. The main research instrument we
proposed to use was the qualitative interview, non-
standardised, and focusing on the coping strategies
which educators and authorities used to solve the
problems of their profession and of the organisation
they work in. Participant observation and structured
observations belonged to our tools as well. It was hard
to explain that we wanted to circumvent the
methodological individualism of survey research, by
making organisations the primary unit of observation
and analysis, not individual persons. They considered
us mildly insane to take the trouble of travelling two
days on unpaved roads to a one class village school in
the jungle, to interview a primary school teacher who
in their opinion was only semi-literate. 'How could
such a person give interesting information on the
functioning of the Venezuelan school system? What a
waste of time for a qualified researcher!' For us it was
an amazing experience to see one of our counterparts
writing a Masters thesis on the planning of educational
services in a sparsely populated area in the South of
Venezuela, without wanting to observe on the spot.
Even the idea did not occur to her. Planning is desk
planning.
There are other aspects to this attitude, not related to
the profession. Among urban middle class people like
our counterparts, the countryside ('the interior', as
they say) is dangerous and dirty. When paved roads
stop and airports don't exist, one can hardly travel.
There are no lodging facilities, no clean restaurants,
there is the risk of a break-down of transport, or
getting lost in the jungle with hundreds of unknown
vile animals. I do exaggerate a little, but the common
idea is that, with the exception of large provincial
towns, the country is uninhabitable for civilised city
people (we of course are the romantics who indulge
ourselves in the hardships of fieldwork).
Nothing is more beyond reality. Venezuela has an
excellent system of roads that reaches to the outer
parts of the country, mostly paved, and if not, of
reasonable quality (except in the rainy reason). The
sparsely populated area mentioned before could be
reached by car in six hours, for the most part along a
good asphalted road. In three years our cars never
broke down. In most small towns there are modest but
clean hotels and restaurants and simple repair
workshops with few tools but the most ingenious
mechanics. More than 10 poisonous snakes and
centipedes I did not see, during all this time. And the
impassable jungle is far away and of marginal interest
to those who study the educational system.
The fieldwork itself presented hardly any compli-
cations, besides the eternal point of appointments on
time. Patience is one of the things I learned,
punctuality one of the things I lost. The management
of introductions needed some investment of time, but
with the local customary paraphernalia of the
fieldworker it went smoothly (visiting cards heavily
titled; a folder with a short description of the
objectives of the project, the sponsoring agencies and
the origin of the funds, to hand out to informants; and
a nice collection of letters of recommendation))1
In getting our letters of recommendation we worked
up and down the hierarchy of educational authorities.
The first letter was from the director of the National
Planning Office, CORDIPLAN, who formally invited
us to Venezuela. With this letter, we obtained a letter
from the director of the Educational Planning Office
(OSPP). For most private schools I had a letter of the
Venezuelan Association of Catholic Education
(AVEC), of which most private schools are members.
The first step in visiting a specific state, was to obtain
with the above mentioned letters a permit to visit
schools from the director of the state Bureau of
Education (the highest chief of the inspectorate on the
regional level). Entering a school and asking
collaboration started with the production of the folder
and a short explanation of the aim of my visit.
Generally, this was sufficient. In case of some
hesitation, I presented one or more of the letters. In no
case did I meet any refusal, or even hints of annoyance.
I always made clear that I was not working for the
inspectorate, but collecting information about the
school system in general, in which the specifics of the
particular school would be made anonymous. To my
surprise (and disappointment, because it indicated
how subdued an atmosphere reigned in Venezuelan
education) I met hardly any resistance to the project.
A secondary school student of the highest grade
refused to fill in a questionnaire, because I could not
convince him that this project was not a second Project
Camelot (which in his perception had led to the
overthrow of the Allende government in Chile). The
rest of his class found him queer, and was angry that
our discussion prevented them from starting to answer
my questions. Of course, I respected the student's
opinion, and tried to explain to a very nervous under-
director (not sure how I would react to this 'offence')
how pleased I was with encountering such a critical
attitude. I must admit, however, that my pleasure
would have been much less, if this had happened on a
large scale. Another case was a short article in Punto, 2
with strongly critical remarks on the 'Venezuelan
education being planned by and sold to foreign
powers'.
Of course, the lack of overt criticism is no proof that it
did not exist. But ifit existed, it was not present among
the people I had to deal with. They did not show
evasive behaviour, and were generally most helpful,
and pleased to get so much attention. The only barrier
we experienced in the field, was in getting access to
high level policy makers and bureaucrats in the
2 Punlo is a small weekly newspaper, related to the largest (but
politically still not very important) left wing party, MAS.
In other societies other methods may be more convenient: personal
telephone calls, personal visits, or otherwise. Generally, one should
follow the hierarchical lines of that society in getting legitimation.
This is what people expect. The risk of being identified with power
holders has to be taken - and can be dealt with, once contacts are
made.
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political and educational field. With some of them we
could not get an interview, but were relegated to lower
level functionaries. If anything, we were considered by
them as a quantité négligeable not representatives of
neo-colonial powers who should be treated wïth 'due
regard'.
Data, tape and paper: a cri de coeur on the write-up
The worst mistake we made was to have a three-year
period of data collection, without sufficient means to
process them. It has taken an extraordinarily long time
to organise all material: four years with full-time
teaching passed until I could even start writing. If
anything was badly assessed, it was the time needed for
post-fieldwork activities. On a full-time basis, it would
have taken about three years after the end of the
fieldwork to finish the project. Since this was not in the
budget (and couldn't be, according to NUFFIC rules),
it became a long march along the paper mass. Since
most material is in Spanish, assistance in Holland was
difficult to get. NUFFIC had closed its books, and
apparently it was none of their business to see whether
reporting on the results would take place or not. After
the flexibility of NUFFIC during fieldwork, their
formalism afterwards was a disappointing obstacle.
Once more, the faculty came to the rescue, by paying
for all coding work on the questionnaires. But this
leniency came to a harsh end after the reorganisation
commission recommended the closure of my home
base. From that moment (May 1981), the faculty has
done everything to prevent me from finishing the
research project. In the beginning, they wanted me to
stop all work on it immediately. After two years of
fighting, the only thing it permitted me to continue
was the writing of a dissertation on the theoretical
aspects of the research, which to me was of secondary
importance. The writing of my policy reports had to be
stopped half way. So, the realisation of the main
objective was blocked. Definitely blocked, since I am
even forced to discontinue any involvement with
research in ldcs, after finishing my book.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Perhaps this case presents a comical coincidence of
adverse circumstances, but most of the problems
mentioned are part and parcel of working in Ides. I still
adhere to the ethical principles on which the project
was based, although I learned to see a formal
agreement with counterparts as an indication of
intentions rather than as a contract that can be relied
upon. Since sanctions are lacking, western researchers
as individuals remain dependent on a host of
circumstances they can hardly influence. Local
conditions determine to a great extent whether the
position of the researcher is strong or weak (and this is
more or less a sign of academic colonialism).
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Grudgingly, I prefer the weak position, throwing
everything on one's negotiating skills in the field. That
is as it should be. Looking back, my conclusion is that
institutional barriers at home and the political
situation in Venezuela were more important in
determining the success or failure of the project, than
cultural discrepancies between counterparts, or even
academic colonialism. In other countries it might have
been otherwise.
Something can be said about improving the chances of
success:
Adequate budgeting is crucial. A good budget
should include, apart from normal items: pre-
paratory trip, to establish personal contacts
between counterparts; flexibility in using funds for
fieldwork; full-time salaries during data processing
and writing; assistance in data processing;
multiplication of reports; translation costs; and if
the research is policy oriented, dissemination,
which may cover the costs of seminars and
workshops to discuss the results and recom-
mendations with policy makers in the host country.
Good budgeting saves a tremendous amount of
fieldwork time. A necessary condition is of course
that funding agencies recognise these budget items.
2 Even more crucial is establishing the personal
involvement of the counterpart(s). They should
consider a research project to be their own,
wherever the funds come from. The best approach
is to accept their research priorities, at least in part.
Second best is presenting to them a research idea.
and elaborating it together into a research plan
from the first moment on. Bad is any finished
research plan, which they only can take or leave.
Even if they accept it, it is no indication of what
they would like. A necessary condition for this is a
rather long preparatory trip, during which all
counterparts are available, at least half of their
working hours. This trip should take place well in
advance of the fieldwork. Agreement should be
reached on at least the following points: general
objectives of the project; theoretical approach:
basic research strategies; the kind of results aimed
at (book, articles, policy reports - for whom?
- etc); division of tasks which gives each
participant a clearly delineated task over which he
or she has full responsibility; and project
organisation and decision-making.
3 In the case of larger research teams, one or more
project managers in the field should be nominated,
who have time at hand for 'network activities'. Of
course, this should he budgeted for, since it
interferes strongly with data collection.
4 Planning the data processing and (at least the first)
write-up should take place on the spot. After
leaving, there is no guarantee that researchers have
sufficient time to finish their task without undue
delay.
5 Fieldwork should be planned in rather short stages
and small parts, if it is a large project. A period no
longer than one year at a time should be dedicated
to fieldwork; still better is a split-half for each team
member (although international travelling costs
will double, which funding agencies may not like),
with an intermittent period for reflection and first
data processing, in order to spot lacunae or points
worthwhile exploring in depth.
6 Long term agreements on research programmes,
instead of temporary relations for one specific
project, are to be preferred.
There is no guarantee of success, however.
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